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IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
Appellants: Jennifer Chapman (Minor) 
Teresa Chapman 
Robert Chapman 
Respondents: SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC., a Utah corporation; 
THE HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign corporation. 
OTHER PARTY DEFENDANTS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL1 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital organized to do 
business in the State of Utah; 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a hospital organized 
to do business in the State of Utah; 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS. By order entered April 1, 
1986, The District court redesigned the name of all of 
the above Other Party Defendants as "I.H.C. Hospitals, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation dba Primary Children's Medical 
Center" (R.283). 
GARTH MEYERS, M.D. ; 
L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., KAREN BOWMAN, R.N. 
JOHN DOE I-X; and 
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V. 
1Appeal No. 860230 from the summary judgment granted as to 
Plaintiffs' claim, in favor of defendants, Primary Children's 
Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain Health 
Care, IHC Hospitals, Inc., and The Health Services of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is presently pending in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Appeal No 860230 involves 
many of the same issues presented by this appeal. 
-iii-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Trial Court was correct in its holding that, as a 
matter of law, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. committed no 
intentional torts against Plaintiffs. 
II. Whether The Home Group Inc.'s ownership of Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. in and of itself is a sufficient basis for a 
claim for damages against The Home Group, Inc. 
III. Whether the Trial Court correctly held that plaintiffs' 
medical negligence claims arising in 1973 are barred by the 
statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing their Complaint 
on October 8, 1985. Their Complaint arises out of the injuries of 
Jennifer Chapman. It is organized in seven Roman numeraled 
sections. The first section, numbered I, simply identifies the 
parties and sets forth the basic factual circumstances of 
plaintiffs' claims. Numbers II through IV purport to state claims 
for medical negligence against defendants, Primary Children's 
Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain Health 
Care, The Health Services Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints,2 Garth Meyers, M.D., L. George Veasy, M.D., 
2These defendants are collectively referred to herein as the 
"Hospital defendants." 
Karen Bowman, R.N,3 and unnamed defendants. Numbers V through 
VIII purport to state claims against all defendants including Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. (-Wetzel") and The Home Group, Inc. ("Home 
Group-) for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In December 1985, the Medical and Hospital Defendants 
moved for summary judgment and dismissal. (R. 38, 88.) The 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, heard the motions on 
February 5, 1986. (R. 384-457.) After taking the matter under 
advisement, Judge Wilkinson granted the medical and hospital 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal. (R. 280, 
282.) Plaintiffs' appeal (Appeal No. 860230) followed. 
On April 15, 1986, defendants Wetzel and Home Group filed 
their Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal. (R. 309.) The 
motions were heard before Judge Wilkinson on May 30, 1986. Judge 
Wilkinson granted Wetzel and Home Groups' Motion for Summary 
Judgment from the bench. (R. 380, 381.) This appeal (Appeal No. 
860392) followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual background has been thoroughly presented in 
the Medical and Hospital Defendants' Respondents' Brief in Appeal 
No. 860230. To avoid unnecessary repetition, Wetzel and Home Group 
3These defendants are collectively referred to as the 
"Medical defendants." 
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adopt the Statement of Facts as found in the Respondents' Brief in 
Appeal No. 860230 (for the Court's convenience, the Statement of 
Facts is attached in an addendum to this Brief at pages 1 to 5), 
with the following additions. 
Defendant Wetzel is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Home 
Group engaged in the business of accident investigation and 
adjustment.4 Wetzel and Home Group are separate corporations. 
Intermountain Health Care (MIHCM) contracted with Wetzel to 
investigate malpractice claims against IHC and its agents. 
Pursuant to the contract with IHC, Wetzel investigated plaintiffs1 
claims. (R. 291-293, A. 6-8.)5 
Wetzel's involvement with Plaintiffs has been limited. In 
1982, Plaintiffs met with Scott Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. At that meeting, Mr. Olsen indicated to Plaintiffs 
that in his opinion Dr. Veasey and Dr. Meyers were "much too 
professional to cover anything up" concerning the cause of Jennifer 
Chapman's injuries. (R. 361.) On May 27, 1983, Mr. Olsen again 
met personally with Plaintiffs. At that time, Plaintiffs alleged 
4Defendant Home Group's only involvement in this case is its 
ownership of Wetzel. Although plaintiffs allege that Home Group 
insured some of the defendants on these claims, the record clearly 
establishes that Home Group did not in fact insure any of the 
defendants at the time plaintiffs' claims arose. (R. 293, 294, 
A. 7, 8.) 
5For the Court's convenience, the affidavit of Scott Olsen, 
the Manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., filed in support of 
Wetzel and Home Groups Motion for Summary Judgment, is attached 
hereto in the addendum at pages 6 to 8. The designation "A " 
refers to the addendum to this Brief. 
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that Jennifer had been injured in February 1973 because there had 
not been a prompt response to her cardiac arrest. Mr. Olsen's 
written response to plaintiffs' claims stated that he had checked 
with the doctors involved in the treatment of Jennifer and that 
they agreed that the problem she experienced was an emboli reaching 
her brain causing the seizure and leading to the cardiac arrest. 
(R. 249-252, A. 9-12.)6 
On July 13, 1983, Mr. Chapman once again telephoned 
Mr. Olsen, alleging that the injury to Jennifer in connection with 
heart surgery in Primary Children's Medical Center in February 
1973, was the result of the negligence of the Medical and Hospital 
Defendants. Mr. Chapman demanded $350,000 in compensation. Mr. 
Olsen advised Mr. Chapman that Wetzel had set up a file on the 
matter in 1978 when Dr. Veasey had met with plaintiffs and their 
attorney, Stephen Crockett, concerning their claims against the 
Medical and Hospital Defendants; that his office had reviewed 
plaintiffs' claims at that time, concluding there was no negligence 
or liability, and that a recent review of that matter reaffirmed 
the original conclusions. (R. 249-252, A. 9-12.) 
In all of plaintiffs' conversations with Wetzel, they 
asserted the same medical malpractice claims raised in their 
present complaint. 
*For the Courts convenience, the affidavit of Scott Olsen, 
Manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., filed in support of the 
medical and hospital defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is 
attached hereto in the addendum at pages 9-12. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Affidavits do not create 
disputed issues of fact requiring this Court to reverse the Trial 
Court's judgment on the fraud and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims. The alleged representations of Wetzel 
giving rise to plaintiffs' claims for fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are three statements, wherein, 
Wetzel's manager, Scott Olsen refuted plaintiffs' claims for 
medical negligence and reiterated the medical defendants' opinions 
that Jennifer's injuries were caused by an emboli reaching her 
brain. This continues to be the position and opinion of these 
defendants to this date. Representations of opinion and 
affirmative denials of allegations are insufficient as a matter of 
law to constitute the basis for a claim for fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Trial Court 
correctly ruled that Wetzel committed no intentional torts against 
plaintiffs. 
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Home Group's 
only involvement in this action is its ownership of Wetzel. Home 
Group's ownership of Wetzel is an insufficient basis for a claim 
for damages against Home Group. Accordingly, the Trial Courts 
judgment granting Home Group's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint is unclear as to whether Plaintiffs 
allege claims against Wetzel and Home Group for medical negligence. 
To the extent such claims are alleged, they are barred by the 
-5-
limitations provision in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contains a statute of limitations 
which in this case, bars plaintiffs' medical negligence claims 
filed after April 2, 1980. Wetzel, as an agent of the Hospital 
Defendants, is entitled to the same protection under the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act as the Hospital and Medical 
Defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims for medical negligence 
are barred by the statute of limitations of the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
WETZEL COMMITTED NO INTENTIONAL TORTS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint includes claims for fraud, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District 
Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, granted Wetzel and Home Groups' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on plaintiffs' claims for fraud, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The Court's decision precluding plaintiffs' claims are correct as a 
matter of law. 
A. The Untroverted Facts Establish That Wetzel Made No 
Representations That Can Serve as a Basis for a Claim of 
Fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Pace v. Parrish, 247 
P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), set forth the elements of the cause of action 
for fraud: 
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This being an action in deceipt based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden was 
upon Plaintiffs to prove all of the essential 
elements thereof. These are: (1) that a 
representation was made; (2) concerning a 
presently-existing material fact; (3) which was 
false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false or (b) made recklessly knowing that 
he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that 
the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Id. at 275-75. Plaintiffs' claim in this case fails as a claim for 
fraud because it fails to state the above elements with particular-
ity as required by Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
because the representations alleged by Plaintiffs cannot serve as a 
basis for a fraud claim as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Affidavits allege only three 
representations by Wetzel. The first occurred in a meeting 
attended by Dr. Veasy, Mr. Chapman and Scott Olsen. According to 
Mr. Chapman, Mr. Olsen made the statement that Doctors Veasy and 
Meyers were "much too professional to cover anything up concerning 
the cause of Jennifer's injury." (R. 361.) The second 
representation was in a letter written by Scott Olsen to 
Mr. Chapman. The letter states simply that Wetzel had conducted an 
investigation of the incident in 1977 and that the doctors were — 
and still are — of the opinion that Jennifer's condition resulted 
from emboli reaching the child's brain. (R. 249-252, A. 9-12.) 
Finally, in a telephone conversation on July 13, 1983, Mr. Olsen 
reaffirmed the original conclusions. (R. 249-252, A. 9-12.) 
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These representations do not constitute representations of the sort 
that can give rise to a claim for fraud. They are expressions of 
opinion which cannot constitute representations of fact for 
purposes of fraud. Poison Company v. Imperial Cattle Company, 624 
P.2d 993, 996 (Mont. 1981). Because the alleged representations of 
Wetzel are merely expressions of opinion and not representations of 
fact, plaintiffs' claim of fraud is insufficient as a matter of law 
and the Trial Court's ruling on this issue should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiffs Have No 
Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress must meet the standards set forth in the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961): 
Our study of the authorities and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us that, conceding 
such a cause of action may not be based upon mere 
negligence, the best considered view recognizes 
an action for severe emotional distress, though 
not accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged 
in some conduct toward the Plaintiff, (a) with 
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or 
(b) where any reasonable person would have known 
that such would result; and his actions are of 
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and 
intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality. 
Id. at 346-47. 
Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress rests on their allegations that Defendants concealed "the 
cause of Jennifer Chapman's injury so that no claim would or could 
be made against the hospital and physician Defendants . . .". 
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(Appellants' Brief at p. 16.) As indicated above, Mr. Olsen's 
statements denying plaintiffs' claims of medical malpractice and 
reaffirming the medical defendants' opinions as to the cause of 
Jennifer's injuries are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a 
claim of fraud or fraudulent concealment. These denials of 
liability and statements of opinion are also insufficient as the 
basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiffs argue that the evidence must go to the jury fo 
a factual determination. However, the case cited by plaintiffs in 
support of their argument, Burgess v. Perdue, 721 P.2d 239 (Kan. 
1986), requires the Court to make two threshold determinations 
before the matter is given to the jury. In Burgess, the trial 
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to 
plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the summary 
judgment and stated: 
[2] Liability for extreme emotional 
distress has two threshold requirements which the 
court must first determine exist. The require-
ments are: (1) Whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and 
outrageous as to permit recovery; and (2) whether 
the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was 
of such an extreme degree that the law must 
intervene because the distress inflicted was so 
severe that no reasonable person should be 
expected to endure it. If the court determines 
from the pleadings, stipulatons, admissions, and 
depositions of the parties that reasonable 
factfinders might differ as to whether defendant's 
conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous 
and the plaintiff's emotional distress was 
genuine and so severe and extreme that it caused 
injury, then it must be left to the jury to 
determine liability. 
Id. at 242. 
In this case, reasonable factfinders could not differ as 
to whether Mr. Olsen's denials of liability and reaffirmations of 
the medical defendants' opinions consitute extreme and outrageous 
conduct giving rise to a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling on this 
issue should be affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiffs Have No 
Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that no claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress exists in the State of 
Utah. In Samms v. Eccles, supra, the court stated that a claim for 
emotional distress cannot be based in Utah upon "mere negligence." 
This view was recently affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Reiser 
v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982). Accordingly, the Trial 
Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs have no claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM AGAINST THE HOME GROUP, INC. 
Although plaintiffs' Complaint does allege that Home Group 
insured some or all of the defendants in this case and that Wetzel 
was acting for Home Group in its investigation for the Hospital 
Defendants, these allegations, even if true, do not constitute a 
claim for damages. In fact, these allegations are without basis. 
The Home Group wrote no insurance covering any of the defendants in 
the case at the time these claims arose. The undisputed facts are 
that Wetzel and Home Group are separate corporations. The only 
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relationship between the two corporations is that Wetzel is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Home Group. The Home Group's ownership 
of Wetzel is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute a 
claim for damages against Home Group. (R. 293, 294, A. 7,8.) See, 
e.g., Rick v. RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39, 44 (E.D. Mich. 1981) 
(applying Mich, law); Bischofshausen, Vasbinder, and Luckie v. D.W. 
Jaquays Min. and Equipment Contractors, Co., 700 P.2d 902, 907 (Az. 
App. 1985); Peterick v. State, 589 P.2d 250, 263-265 (Wash. App. 
1978). Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling with respect to Home 
Group should be affirmed. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
It is unclear from plaintiffs' Complaint whether they have 
alleged claims for medical negligence against Wetzel and Home 
Group. To the extent such claims are alleged, they are barred by 
the limitations provision in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The applicable statute of limitations for claims for medical 
negligence is set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
§ 78-14-1, et seg., UTAH CODE ANN. It provides: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
four years after the date of the alleged act, 
omissions, neglect, or occurrence, except that: 
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(b) In an action where it is alleged 
that a patient has been prevented from 
discovering this conduct on the part of a 
health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall 
apply to all persons, regardless of minority or 
other legal disability under section 78-12-36, or 
any other provision of the law, and shall apply 
retroactively to all persons, partnerships, 
associations and corporations, and to all health 
care providers and to all malpractice actions 
against nealth care providers based upon alleged 
personal injuries which occurred prior to the 
effective date of this Act; provided, however, 
that any action which under former law could have 
been commenced after the effective date of this 
Act may be commenced only within the unelapsed 
portion of time allowed under former law; but any 
action which under former law could have been 
commenced more than four years after the 
effective date of this Act may be commenced only 
within four years after the effective date of 
this Act. 
(§ 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN.) 
It is undisputed that the acts upon which the alleged 
medical negligence claims are based occurred in 1973. Although 
Jennifer Chapman was a minor at that time, section 78-14-4 UTAH 
CODE ANN. applies "to all persons regardless of minority or other 
legal disability and shall apply retroactively . . .H. To be 
timely, plaintiffs' Complaint had to be filed within four years 
after the effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was 
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April 2, 1976. Accordingly, the last date on which Plaintiffs1 
claims could have been brought was April 2, 1980, or four years 
after the effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint with the 
Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on October 
8, 1985. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims for medical negligence 
are barred by section 78-14-4 UTAH CODE ANN. 
A. Wetzel and Home Group Are Health Care Providers as 
Defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The term "health care provider- is defined in Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act: 
(1) "Health Care Provider" includes any 
person, partnership, association, corporation or 
other facility or institution who causes to be 
rendered or who renders health care or 
professional services as a hospital, physician, 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse 
midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, 
clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatrist, pyschologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician and surgeon, odiologist, 
speech pathologist, certified social worker, 
social service worker, social service aide, 
marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of 
obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
service relating to or arising out of the health 
care needs of persons or groups of persons, and 
officers, employees, or agents of any of the 
above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
§ 78-14-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Wetzel is the agent of the Hospital 
Defendants; IHC contracted with Wetzel to investigate claims of 
malpractice against IHC and its agents (R. 291-293, A. 6-8.) In 
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their Complaint, Plaintiffs admit the agency relationship between 
IHC and Wetzel: 
. . . The reason for the failure to discover 
such negligence was due to the negligent and/or 
intentional fraudulent concealment of the cause 
of plaintiffs injury by defendants and/or their 
agents or employees including Wetzel and/or The 
Home Group. 
(Plaintiffs1 Complaint at 1[ 14.) 
Since Wetzel is the agent of the Hospital Defendants — a 
fact alleged by Plaintiffs and assumed to be true — all claims 
for medical negligence against Wetzel are barred by the statute of 
limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
B. The Statute of Limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act Is Not Tolled by Estoppel. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the bar of the statute of 
limitations by arguing that a disputed factual issue exists 
regarding misrepresentations by the Hospital and Medical Defendants 
and Wetzel concerning the true cause of the injury suffered by 
Jennifer Chapman. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care provider 
because that health care provider has affirma-
tively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
§ 78-14-4(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN. In essence, this section requires 
affirmative action by a health care provider preventing a plaintiff 
from discovering misconduct on the part of the health care provider. 
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The undisputed facts in this case establish that Wetzel 
did nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from discovering the facts 
underlying their claims for medical negligence. 
As set forth above, Plaintiffs allege only three repre-
sentations by Wetzel; a statement by Mr. Olsen that Drs. Veasy and 
Meyers were "much too professional to cover anything up concerning 
the cause of Jennifer's injury", and a letter and telephone 
conversation denying Plaintiffs* allegations of medical negligence 
and reaffirming the medical defendants opinion that Jennifer's 
condition resulted from emboli reaching her brain. (R. 249-252, 
361, 362, A. 9-12.) 
These representations do not constitute representations of 
the sort that can give rise to a claim of fraudulent concealment. 
All are mere expressions of opinion denying plaintiffs' accusation 
of wrongdoing and cannot, therefore, "constitute fraudulent conceal-
ment" for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. Clark 
v. Airesearch Manufacturing Company of Arizona, Inc., 673 P.2d 984, 
987 (Ariz. App. 1983). 
Even if these representations could constitute a fraudulent 
concealment, it is clear that Plaintiffs were not deceived by these 
representations. An allegation of fraudulent concealment does not 
toll a statute of limitations if reasonable inquiry on the part of 
Plaintiffs would have revealed the claimed fraud prior to the time 
of filing their complaint. Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 52 
(Utah 1978); McKonkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah 1974). 
Plaintiffs' belief that medical malpractice occurred existed prior 
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to and continued through and after plaintiffs' conversations and 
correspondence with Mr, Olsen. All of the facts in the complaint 
filed in 1985 were known or could readily have been known in 1973. 
Since at least 1977, Plaintiffs were represented by six different 
attorneys employed with respect to the malpractice alleged in this 
case. (R. 108, 109 and 257.) In addition, Mr. Chapman wrote a 
letter on or about May 2, 1977, suggesting that Mr. Chapman 
believed he had a claim for malpractice against the Medical 
Defendants in this case. (R. 111-118.) These facts indicate that 
well before the representations were made by Mr. Olsen, Plaintiffs 
believed that they had a claim for malpractice against the Medical 
and Hospital Defendants in this case. Accordingly, Wetzel's 
representations do not, as a matter of law, toll the statute of 
limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
C. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and Its Statute of 
Limitations Are Constitutional. 
The constitutionality of the statute of limitations in the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has been thoroughly briefed by the 
Medical and Hospital Defendants in the Respondents' Brief in Appeal 
No. 860230. To avoid unnecessary repetition, Wetzel and Home Group 
adopt the argument presented in Respondent's Brief (for the court's 
convenience, Respondents argument on this issue is attached in the 
Addendum at pages 13-38.) 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly ruled that the statute of 
limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act bars 
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plaintiffs' medical negligence claims and that the representations 
of Wetzel are an insufficient basis, as a matter of law, for claims 
of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress• In 
addition, the Trial Court properly ruled that Utah law does not 
provide a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or a 
claim for damages against a corporation based solely on its 
ownership of a subsidiary corporation. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of Wetzel and 
Home Group. 
DATED this day of November, 1986. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
^cuUs S~ Y)/MA*H*—-
Stephen B. Nebeker 
Anthony B. Quinn 
Paul D. Newman 
Attorneys for Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. and The Home 
Group, Inc. 
0791n 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, attorney for Respondents Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. and The Home Group, Inc., hereby certifies that on 
November , 1986, he caused to be served the foregoing 
Respondents' Brief on all parties to this Appeal by mailing four 
(4) copies thereof by first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to their attorneys as follows: 
KATHRYN COLLARD, ESQ. 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. RICHARD MEYER, ESQ. 
ROBERT N. WILLIAMS, ESQ. 
P.O. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
DATED this Jl9 ^ day of November, 1986, 
0791n 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Medical and Hospital Defendant's 
STATEMENT OF FACTS A-l to A-5 
Affidavit of Scott Olsen A-6 to A-8 
Affidavit of Scott Olsen A-9 to A-12 
Medical and Hospital Defendant's 
Argument Re: Constitutionality 
of § 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED A-13 to A-38 
\ ^ ^ In December 1985, defendant Garth Myer, M.D. filed a 
motion to oisi^ iss and defendants L. George Veasy, M.D., Karen 
Bowman, R.N., and rhehospital defendants moved for summary 
judgment and dismissal. (It>^8, 88.) These motions were heard 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on February 5, 1986. 
After taking the matter under advisement
 f
x
*9uitoe Wilkinson granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment and disml**^l. (R. 267, 
282.) Plaintiffs' appeal followed. ^*^\ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jennifer Chapman, now 14-years old, was born on August 
10, 1972, and was treated for "blue spells" by doctors in Ogden 
for the first five to seven months of her life. She was then 
referred to the Primary Children's Medical Center and was 
admitted by defendant L. George Veasy, M.D. (R. 141.) 
On or about February 14, 1973, an operation to install 
a device called a Waterston Shunt was performed by a doctor who 
was not a named defendant. The purpose of that operation was to 
increase the flow of blood to Jennifer's lungs. The operation 
"over-corrected" the initial problem and on February 28, 1973 a 
second operation was performed to modify the shunt. (R. 141.) 
A few hours after the operation Jennifer suffered a 
cardiac arrest while she was in the recovery room. Resuscitative 
efforts saved Jennifer's life, but it was determined immediately 
thereafter that she had sustained severe and irreversible brain 
damage. (R. 141-142.) 
In the months and years following Jennifer's cardiac 
arrest in 1973, her parents (plaintiffs) had several discussions 
and considerable correspondence with defendant Veasy. On several 
of those occasions they alleged that medical negligence during 
her hospital stay at the Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February of 1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition. (R. 107, 
A-2; R. 256-257, A-20-A-21.) These facts are supported by the 
affidavit of Dr. Veasy and were not disputed by plaintiffs. 
As an example and as evidence of such allegations of 
negligence made by the Chapmans, Dr. Veasy was able to produce a 
hand-written letter from Robert Chapman to him which he received 
sometime prior to May 2, 1977. (See Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of 
L. George Veasy, M.D., and typed version immediately following 
Exhibit "A". R. Ill, A-6.) Appellant Chapman wrote in his 
letter that the "negligence is obvious". (R. 117, A-12.) 
Frequently since 1973 Dr. Veasy participated in 
providing or coordinating medical care for Jennifer Chapman at 
the request of her parents Robert Chapman and Teresa Chapman. 
Based on his personal conversations and correspondence with the 
Chapmans, Dr. Veasy said under oath that, "I know and state that 
continuously since 1973 [the Chapmans] have believed, albeit 
erroneously, that the episode which Jennifer Chapman experienced 
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at Primary Children's Medical Center in February 1973 was 
preventable and resulted from medical negligence by those who 
attended her." (R. 108, A-3.) 
Between November of 1977 and July of 1985, plaintiffs 
conferred with at least five different attorneys before their 
present counsel became involved. It is undisputed that various 
attorneys representing the plaintiffs have contacted the 
defendants regarding claims now asserted in plaintiffs' complaint 
(R. 257, A-21), including but not limited to attorney Richard D. 
Burbidge who contacted defendants in November 1977 and attorney 
Stephen G. Crockett who contacted defendants in January 1979, 
plus attorneys representing at least five additional law firms 
thereafter. (R. 108, 109, A-3, A-4.) 
The events related in an affidavit of Scott Olsen were 
also uncontradicted by the appellants. (R. 249, A-14.) 
Essentially, Mr. Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc., an insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
related that on several different occasions the Chapmans had 
asserted the same medical malpractice claims as now raised in 
their present complaint. As he related, on May 27, 1983 he 
personally met with Robert and Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer also 
present. At that time the Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had 
been injured in February 1973 in connection with problems that 
developed following the second cardiac operation, because there 
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had not been a prompt response to Jennifer's cardiac arrest. 
(R. 250, A-15.) 
On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman again phoned Mr. Olsen, 
again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connection 
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr. 
Myers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its 
employees. He was advised that Mr. Olsen's office had set up a 
file on this matter in 1978 when Dr. Veasy had met with the 
Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen Crockett, concerning their 
claims against Primary Children's Medical Center and others; that 
his office had reviewed the Chapman's claims at that time, and 
had concluded there was no negligence or liability. (R. 250, A-
15.) In both the claims registered by the Chapmans in 1978 and 
1983, they alleged the same malpractice, that is, that Jennifer 
had suffered brain damage by a hypoxic insult that was due to the 
failure of Nurse Bowman to recognize the alleged cardiac arrest 
of Jennifer Chapman. (R. 253, A-18.) 
In December 1985 after plaintiffs' present counsel 
filed suit, counsel for defendants moved for summary judgment 
alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs' alleged causes of 
action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 38, 
5- A-4 
88.) The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of 
all defendants. (R. 282.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In\1976 the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health 
Care Malpractioe Act to protect the public from adverse effects 
of the rising incidents and cost of medical malpractice claims. 
This Court on several prior occasions has upheld that the 
constitutionality of the Act, including the statute of 
limitations. \ 
It is well-settled that it is within the Legislature's 
prerogative to determine whether a statute of limitations applies 
or is tolled with respect to minors# claims. Minors have no 
inherent constitutional exemption\from the operation of a statute 
of limitations. The legislative intent in this instance is 
unequivocally clear that in the public^s interest minors' claims 
against health care providers must be timely filed. Legislative 
intent distinguishes this circumstance fronk the court decisions 
in other cases upon which appellants rely. \ 
In harmony with federal and foreign state decisions, 
this Court has consistently applied a rational basis test to 
determine if a statute unconstitutionally denies guarantees of 
equal protection and access to courts. The Court has previously 
determined that the Legislature may properly treat health\care 
providers as a separate class, and it is abundantly clear that 
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STEPHEN B. NEBEKER (A2371) and 
ANTHONY B. QUINN (A2672) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Scott Wetzel Company and 
The Home Group, Inc. 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and 
through her guardian, 
TERESA CHAPMAN, ROBERT CHAPMAN 
and TERESA CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, 
a hospital organized to do 
business in the State of Utah; 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL 
CENTER, a hospital organized 
to do business in the State 
of Utah; INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
CARE, a Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; THE HEALTH 
SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or 
present Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
GARTH MEYERS, M.D.; L. GEORGE 
VEASY, M.D.; KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.; 
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, a Utah 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT OLSEN 
Civil No. C-85-6782 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
A-6 
corporation; THE HOME GROUP, : 
INC., a foreign corporation; 
JOHN DOE I-X; and BLACK CORPOR- : 
ATIONS I-V, 
Defendants. 
00O00 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Scott Olsen being first duly sworn deposes and states that: 
1. He is the manager of the Salt Lake office of Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. 
2. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. was incorporated in the 
State of Washington on January 29, 1971. 
3. One hundred percent of the stock of Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. was purchased by The Home Group, Inc. on January 11, 
1973. 
4. The document attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the 
copy of the contract between Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and the 
Intermountain Health Care which was in effect at the time the file 
was opened in this matter. 
5. All of the efforts of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. done 
in connection with the investigation of the Chapmans* claim were 
done pursuant to the agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
None of the investigative or other services performed by Wetzel 
were performed on behalf of The Home Group, Inc. 
6. The Home Group, Inc. did not issue any insurance 
policy covering any of the defendants named in the Complaint at the 
time the claim arose. 
7. The predecessor of Intermountain Health Care was 
covered by two policies in 1973: one issued by Reserve Insurance 
Company and the other by Appalachian Insurance Company. 
8. The predecessor of Intermountain Health Care had a 
self-insured retention of $25,000 at the time the claim arose. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of April, 
1986 
My Commission Expires 
i9- l-?? 
Notary/ 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
0764q 
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B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617 
David B. Erickson - A3788 
KIRTON, McCONKIE 6 BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah, et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SCOTT OLSEN 
Civil No. C85-6782 
(HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned Scott Olsen, being first duly sworn on 
oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., an 
insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah, which for 
many years has represented Primary Children's Medical Center and 
its predecessors in matters of legal liability claimed against 
the hospital and its agents. I have been employed by Scott 
feConkla 
•hn*M 
ial CwDorsMn j 
no EAST 
A - a 
Wetzel Services, Inc. since 1976 and I am familiar with this 
agency's records relating to claims by Jennifer Chapman and her 
parents against Primary Children's Medical Center and others 
relating to surgery performed on Jennifer Chapman in February 
1973. 
2. On May 27, 1983 I met personally with Robert and 
Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer also present. At that time the 
Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had been injured in February 1973 
in connection with problems that developed following a second 
cardiac operation, because there had not been a prompt response 
to Jenniferfs cardiac arrest. On June 17, 1983 I wrote a letter 
to Robert Chapman, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
-A". 
3. On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman telephoned me, 
again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connection 
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr. 
Meyers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its 
employees. He demanded $350,000 in compensation. I again 
advised him that we had set up a file on this matter in 1978 when 
Dr. Veasy had met with the Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen 
Crockett, concerning their claims against Primary Children's 
Medical Center and others; that we had reviewed their claims at 
that time, concluding there was no negligence or liability; and 
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that again more recently we had reviewed the matter and 
reaffirmed our original conclusions. Mr. Chapman became very 
abusive to me over the telephone. 
4. On July 23, 1985 I sent a letter to Black fc Moore, 
attorneys for the Chapmans, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". Before sending that letter I again carefully 
reviewed the files of our offices. The statements in Exhibit "B" 
accurately reflect the results of that review of our file on this 
claim. 
5. I have read the foregoing and declare the content 
thereof to be true of my own knowledge, except as to matters set 
forth upon information and belief, and as to such matters I 
believe them to be true. 
Scott Olsen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
February, 1986. 
/ 
Notary 
day of 
My Commission Expires: ^S Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
•cConkte 
»hn«H 
* i Corporator j 
IO0EAST 
kKE CITY 
•4111 
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Scott Wetzel Services Incorporated 
An Affiliate of The Home Group, tnc 
833 East 400 South, Suite 104 • Saft Lake City, Utah 84102 
Phone (801) 322-2541 
June 17, 1983 
Dbert Chapman 
597 South 1100 West 
iverdale, Utah 84403 
E: Insured: Primary Children's Medical Center 
Clainent: Jennifer Chapman (minor) 
D/LDSS: 2-28-73 
Our File: 112-47-73 
ear Mr. Chapman: 
enjoyed the visit we had on May 27, 1983 with you and your wife and Jennifer. 
was able to go back in our files and find that a claim had been set up concern-
ing your child back in 1977. We at that tire, checked with the doctors involved 
n the treatment of Jennifer and they all agreed that the problem that she 
ixperienced was caused by an emboli reaching your child's brain which caused the 
seizure and that led to the cardiac arrest. They have not changed their opinion 
it this time, so as you can see, I have to rely on the doctor's diagnosis of 
our child's problem. 
is to the other things we spoke of during the meeting, I feel that it will be 
ecessary for you to follow-up with therapy and any other treatment that your 
hild does now or should receive. 
don't know what else I can do at the present time to help you, but I will be 
ore than happy to listen to whatever suggestions you may have. Please feel free 
JO call at any time at the above number. 
Very truly yours, 
Scott Olsen 
»/ll 
:/c Charles Doane, Prinary Children's Medical Center 
A-l^r> 
EXHIBIT "A" 
buffered from extreme lack of oxygen and sustained permanent' 
braih\damage." (R. 6.) Under the undisputed facts, any claimed 
medical malpractice was thus complete at the time of the February 
1973 injury.^Even if continuing negligence were adequately 
alleged, the statute still runs from the time of discovery of the 
injury and not from thVtermination of a physician-patient 
relationship. N. 
Note that even the Peteler court decision relied on by 
the appellants recognized that vherVnegligent treatment is not 
continuing, the statute of limitations oar would be complete. 
See Peteler v. Robison. 81 Utah 535, , 17\^.2d at 249. To the 
extent that Peteler could be read to hold otherwise, it was 
specifically disapproved in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 wtah 2d 199, 
436 P.2d 435 (1968). The statute of limitations thus barsythe 
appellants' action. 
III. THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND. 
Appellants have devoted the greater part of their brief 
to attacking the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act statute of limitations. A review of pertinent 
case law will show that every Utah court which has tested the 
constitutionality of the Act under the theories raised by 
appellants has rejected the same constitutional arguments which 
appellants now assert. 
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A. Utah Case Law Precedents. 
In reaching its decision to uphold Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-14-4, the Court can rely on a long line of Utah Supreme 
Court decisions which have strongly and consistently upheld the 
provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act, including its 
statute of limitations, against constitutional challenges. See, 
e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 
1981); Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1979); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
Federal courts reviewing constitutional challenges to 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act have also uniformly upheld 
the validity of § 78-14-4. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 
600 (10th Cir. 1983); Hargett v. Limberq, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D. 
Utah 1984). 
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., supra, is typical of the support the Court has given 
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical 
malpractice. In Allen the Court unanimously rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations 
for medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees 
of equal protection. The Court held that: (1) the Utah 
"legislature exercised its discretionary prerogative in 
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determining that the shortening of the statute of limitations 
. . . would insure the continued availability of health care 
services,"; and (2) such action does not exceed constitutional 
prohibitions. 635 P.2d at 32 (footnote omitted). 
Appellants apparently acknowledge that Allen was 
properly decided (Appellants' Brief at 32) and that the 
Legislature may rationally limit the time for filing malpractice 
claims as to adults, but argue it may not so limit minor's 
claims. Appellants' argument overlooks, however, the fundamental 
principle that the legislature may place minors on equal footing 
with adults without infringing their constitutional rights. As 
explained in Vance v. Vancef 108 U.S. 514 (1883): 
The Constitution of the United States . • • gives 
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it 
is within the legislative competency of the State 
. . . to make exceptions in their favor or not. 
The exemptions from the operation of statutes of 
limitation, usually accorded to infants and 
married women, do not rest upon any general 
doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected 
to their action, but in every instance upon 
express language in those statutes giving them 
time after majority . . . to assert their rights. 
Id. at 521. See also Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d 
671, 673 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) (medical malpractice action not 
tolled by plaintiff's infancy); Licano v. Karusnick, 663 P.2d 
1066, 1068 (Colo. App. 1983) (the legislature is the primary 
judge of whether the time period allowed to a minor is 
reasonable); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 
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891, 893 (1980) (legislature is not under any constitutional 
mandate to suspend operation of statutes of limitation in cases 
of infancy or incapacity); 51 Am. Jur. 2d 750, Limitation of 
Actions § 182 (1970) (minority does not per se bestow immunity 
upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving in 
his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run 
against the claims of infants in the absence of a contrary 
statute)• 
This principle was reaffirmed by the decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Hargett 
v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984). In that decision the 
federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
health care providers, holding that the minor plaintiff's claim 
was barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. In 
doing so the court considered and rejected the same constitu-
tional attack the appellants have launched in their opposition to 
these defendants' motions. The court's opinion recognizes as 
"universally accepted" the rule that a "legislature may put 
adults and infants on the same footing with respect to statutes 
of limitation without affecting constitutional rights." Id. at 
156. 
Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion 
with respect to operation of the statute of limitations against 
minors' claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., 
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Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971# 972 (10th Cir. 1980) 
("It is well established that a claimant's minority does not toll 
the running of the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act*); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 
1965) (minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and 
parents or guardians of a minor must preserve a claim by timely 
action); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.)/ 
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (equal protection guarantees 
are not violated by applying a shortened statute of limitations 
to a minor's claim)• 
Sound state and federal case precedents clearly show 
that the statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, which places adults and minors on equal footing, 
is a constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a 
rational response to the stated legislative purpose of addressing 
a crisis in the availability of medical malpractice insurance and 
its attendant effect upon the quality of health care in the State 
of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
B. Scott v. School Board of Granite School District Did 
Not Invalidate the Medical Malpractice Statute of 
Limitations as Applied to Minors' Claims. 
The primary thrust of appellants' argument is that the 
Court has already declared the statute of limitations of 
§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors unconstitutional in Scott v. 
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 
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1977). The statutory provision at issue in Scott was Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1977), the notice of claim provision of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. 
(1977)• Appellants contend that the sweeping dictum "in all 
cases" contained in the Court's opinion invalidated not only 
§ 63-30-13, but all provisions which limit the effect of the 
general tolling provision for minor's claims set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (1977). 
Appellants' reading of Scott overstates the Court's 
holding. Scott is not a case of constitutional dimension; it is, 
rather, an example of judicial interpretation of statutes to 
further the Legislature's intent and objectives. 
A line of Utah cases prior to Scott had held that the 
tolling provisions of § 78-12-36 did not excuse a minor's failure 
to timely file the notice of claim required by § 63-30-13 before 
commencing an action against a political subdivision of the 
state. See, e.g., Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 
(1973). 
In 1973, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-7-77, a notice of claim provision relating to certain claims 
against cities or incorporated towns which was similar in content 
and effect to § 63-30-13.1 The amendment provided: 
xSection 10-7-77 was later repealed by Laws 1978 ch. 27, 
§ 12. 
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If the person for whom a claim is made is a minor, then 
the claims covered by this section may be so presented 
within the time limits specified above or within one 
year after the person reaches the age of majority, 
whichever is longer. 
In Scott the Court found that this amendment, coupled 
with the Legislature's enactment of the general tolling provision 
in § 78-12-36(1), made it "abundantly clear" that the Legisla-
ture's general intent at that time was to protect minors' claims 
against governmental entities. 568 P.2d at 748. Given that 
legislative intent, and the similarities between the two notice 
of claim provisions, the Court was unable to find any reason for 
the 1973 Legislature's failure to similarly amend § 63-30-13. 
The Court therefore held that the legislative intent which 
resulted in the aonendment of § 10-7-77 also applied to § 63-30-13 
and the minor's claim should be preserved. The Court did not 
declare § 63-30-13 unconstitutional, but simply overruled a prior 
line of cases in deference to what the Court perceived to be a 
new expression of legislative grace in favor of minors. 
The Scott decision is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's prior rulings concerning judicial review of legislative 
enactments. The Court has stated that its primary responsibility 
and purpose in interpreting statutory enactments is to give 
effect to the underlying legislative intent. Millett v. Clark 
Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). The Court has also 
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stated that it will avoid constitutional questions wherever 
possible: 
The right and power of the judiciary to declare 
whether legislative enactments exceed constitu-
tional limitations is to be exercised with 
considerable restraint and in conformity with 
fundamental rules. One such fundamental rule of 
long-standing is that unnecessary decisions are to 
be avoided and that the court should pass upon the 
constitutionality of a statute only when such a 
determination is essential to the decision in a 
case. . . . An attack on the validity of a 
statute cannot be made by parties whose interest 
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced 
by the operation of the statute. 
A further fundamental rule is that the courts do 
not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is 
it within their province to exercise the delicate 
power pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in 
abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases. 
It has been found to be far wiser, and it has 
become settled as a qeneral principle, that a 
constitutional question is not to be reached if 
the merits of the case in hand may be fairly 
determined on other than constitutional issues. 
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). 
The Scott decision is consistent with these rules of 
judicial review. The decision interpreted and gave full effect 
to the perceived legislative intent. It did not, however, 
invalidate the notice of claim statute, nor did the Court review 
and pass upon the constitutionality of any other statutory 
provision not before the Court. 
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IV. SECTION 78-14-4 IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE 
ENACTMENT. 
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on 
constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof. Judicial 
review of a properly enacted law begins with the strong 
presumption that the law is constitutional. State v. Murphy, 674 
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983). This Court has consistently 
observed that it is not the function of the judiciary to second 
guess the wisdom or propriety of legislation. 
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is 
not for us to consider . . . mthere is, without 
doubt, plenty of room, within the pale of the 
Constitution, for ill-advised legislation. . . . 
That is a matter between the people and the 
representatives." . . . Within the limits of the 
Constitution it is the prerogative of the legisla-
ture to control such matters, and the fact that an 
act may be ill-advised or unfortunate, if such it 
be, does not give rise to an appeal from the 
Legislature to the courts for correction. . . . 
Under our system of government it is important 
that each branch thereof avoid infringement upon 
the prerogatives of the other. 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin.f 122 
Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952) [citations omitted]; see also 
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct. 
715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981). By judicial mandate this court must 
not interfere with the Legislature's exercise of its prerogative 
unless a constitutional infringement is clearly established. 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981). 
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A. Standard of Review. 
Appellants' challenge the constitutionality of 
§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors on two grounds: (1) the provision 
violates guarantees of equal protection of laws found within the 
United States and Utah Constitutions; and (2) the provision 
violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution relating 
to a litigant's right of access to the courts.2 The rational 
basis standard of review is the appropriate standard for deciding 
both of appellants' constitutional challenges. See Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 14 (Utah 1984) (equal protection 
rational basis analysis applies to review of rights guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution). 
1. Equal protection. 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution embody the same fundamental principle: 
"Persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and per-
sons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 669. 
^Article I, Section 11 provides: "All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party." 
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A statute may treat groups differently and still meet 
constitutional equal protection and access to the courts 
requirements if: (1) the lav applies equally to all persons 
within a class; and (2) the statutory classifications and dif-
ferent treatment given the classes have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute. Malan v. Levis, supra, at 
670. 
The rational basis standard of reviev cited above has 
been used by the Utah Supreme Court in all its prior revievs of 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. See, e.g., Allen 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) 
(cited in Malan v. Levis, supra at 670). It is also the standard 
of review used by nearly all other state appellate courts vhich 
have revieved the constitutionality of their ovn respective 
medical malpractice statutes. See American Bank and Trust 
Company v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr. 
671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984) (citing 23 states and 3 
federal circuits vhich have applied the rational basis standard 
of reviev). The "strict scrutiny* and "means-focus" standards of 
reviev plaintiffs urge the court to adopt in this case are not 
applied to legislation vhich does not create a "suspect class" or 
affect a "fundamental constitutional right." Malan v. Levis, 
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supra at 674 n. 17.J The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah has already rejected the argument for applying a 
"means-focus" review to a minor's constitutional challenge to the 
Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations: 
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class 
of minors with medical malpractice claims does not 
involve a fundamental interest or a classification 
of a suspect character. • . • 
The correct standard for equal protection 
analysis to be applied in this case under both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions is the 
rational basis test. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984) (citing 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 
(1981); Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); 
American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal.3d 359, 
204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984); and Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981)). 
Additional support for the principle that minors are 
not a "suspect" class is found in nearly every jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Halet v. Wend Investment Company, 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 
(9th Cir. 1982) ("children are not an 'insular minority'"); 
Williams v. City of Lewiston, Maine, 642 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 
4The "means-focus" or "heightened scrutiny" analysis adopted 
by such cases as Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), has 
come under attack by other appellate courts. See e.g., Fitz v. 
Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1983) ("We are unpersuaded by 
the reasoning of Carson and decline to follow it."). 
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1981) ("Minors are not a 'suspect' class"); Rollison v. Biggs, 
567 F.Supp. 964, 972 n.14 (D. Del. 1983) ("courts have applied 
the traditional rational relation test upon finding that 
handicapped children do not constitute a suspect class")• Colin 
K. v. Schmidt, 536 F.Supp. 1375, 1388 (D.R.I. 1982) ("handicapped 
children do not constitute a suspect class"); Hale v. City of 
Santa Paula, 159 Cal. 3d 1233, 206 Cal. Rptr. 265# 270 (1984) 
(rational relationship test is used to determine the validity of 
a statute since minors are not a suspect class); Faucher v. City 
of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983) (since age is not a 
suspect classification, the legislative scheme should be upheld 
if it bears some rational relationship to the conceivable 
legitimate state interest or purpose). 
2. Access to courts. 
Appellants have additionally challenged the statute of 
limitations under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. These respondents do not believe, however, that 
the appellants' open court argument is applicable to the facts of 
this case. 
In essence, appellants' arguments simply speaks to the 
general question of whether there is denial of access to court 
when there is discovery of an injury after a statute of 
limitations has run, or when a minor does not have a parent or 
guardian willing or able to bring an action on his behalf. 
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Appellant has avoided the application of the cited law to the 
facts in this case. This case is distinguishable from Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), since in this 
case there was discovery several years before the statute ran and 
parents willing to assert the minor child's claim. 
Section 78-14-4 is reasonable in its scope and 
effect. Appellant argues, though, that it may bar some causes of 
action before they accrue. Such a result is extremely unlikely 
since section 78-14-4 expressly excludes from its operation the 
tvo fact situations most likely to be discovered more than four 
years from the date of the treatment: when a foreign object has 
been wrongfully left within a patient's body, and when the health 
care provider fraudulently conceals the alleged misconduct. In 
either case, the cause of action is not barred until after the 
wrongful action has been or should have been discovered. See 
§ 78-14-4(1)(a)-(b). Since most other forms of wrongdoing are 
typically discoverable within four years from the date of 
occurrence, few causes of action ate barred before they arise. 
Thus, when a cause of action is barred by the four-year statute 
of repose, it is generally not because the claim has gone 
undiscovered, but because the claimant has simply waited too long 
to assert it. The Utah Legislature found it necessary in the 
public interest to bar stale claims so that professional 
liability insurance premiums could be "reasonably and accurately 
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calculated." Id. Old claims could be avoided.4 A specific 
period within which claims could be brought was necessary to 
reduce and stabilize spiraling health care costs and to ensure 
continued quality health care services. 
This same conclusion was reached in Wheaton v. Jack, 
Civil No. C-82-0039 (D. Utah, Aug. 9, 1982) (attached at A-24). 
There, the plaintiff filed her action in 1982, complaining of a 
major surgery performed in 1966. The plaintiff argued that the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act unconstitutionally denied her 
the right of access to the courts. The federal court found that: 
[T]he legislature was responding to a medical 
malpractice crisis that was causing the cost of health 
care to increase to the point that it threatened to be 
available only to the rich. The legislature also found 
that the quality of that care had diminished because 
health care providers, in response to the numerous 
suits being filed, were practicing defensive medicine 
rather than providing the best care possible. 
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted); A-32, A-33. Based on those 
findings, the court concluded: 
The overpowering public necessity of making available 
the best health care possible justifies the abolition 
of the right to access to the courts in medical 
malpractice cases four years after the occurrence of 
the act, omission, neglect or occurrence which caused 
the injury. The legislature balanced the conflicting 
limitation periods that have the effect of eliminating 
stale claims are not improper. See Order of Railroad 
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 
(1944) ; see also Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 320-21 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
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intersest and determined that there was no less onerous 
alternative for alleviating the crisis. Therefore, 
§ 78-14-4 does not violate article I, section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 10; A-33. 
Appellants have also argued that the status of 
"minority" deprives minors access to court. It is true that in 
minor injury cases the claim will have to be brought on the 
child's behalf by his parent or guardian. However, it is not 
inequitable or improper to place some responsibility on parents 
or guardians to protect and preserve a minor's claim for an 
injury that accompanies a failure to diagnose or treat. After 
all, parents make daily choices during a child's minority which 
certainly affect the child's future. Parents choose, on the 
minor's behalf, the extent of medical intervention and treatment 
of a child's illnesses. The Utah Legislature recognized this 
responsibility by enacting § 78-14-4. 
The statute of limitations in the Act is not irrational 
merely because a parent as natural guardian or someone else as 
guardian ad litem may need to pursue the child's cause of action 
on the child's behalf. In many instances parents have the 
primary responsibility to protect, educate and care for their 
children. Some specific duties now placed on the parent for the 
child's protection are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-6 
(parent or guardian may sue for death or injury of minor caused 
by wrongful act or neglect of another); 78-45-3 (every man shall 
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support his child); 78-45-9 (every man shall support his child); 
78-45-9 (an obligee or state department of social services may 
enforce a child's right of support against parent); 76-7-201 
(failure to provide medical care is criminal neglect; see also 12 
A.L.R.2d 1047). Compare Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 
1976) (children have a right to support); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Utah 
2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968) (parent under legal duty to pay 
medical care); Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977) (parent 
cannot rid himself of duty to support his children by contract); 
Gavand v. Gawand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980) (parent has duties to 
support retarded child). See also 34 A.L.R.2d 1460 (right of 
child against parent for support).5 Further, the Utah Supreme 
Court has long recognized that a statute of limitations may run 
against a minor where rights are vested in a parent or guardian. 
Trinnaman v. dinger, 26 Utah 2d 111# 485 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1971); 
Parr v. Zions First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461 
(1962); Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936 (1903). 
^Note also that parents are natural guardians of minor 
children. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward § 5, and that a 
guardian has not only a right, but a duty, to institute and 
prosecute litigation necessary to maintain and preserve a ward's 
rights. A guardian may also be liable for a loss caused by the 
guardian's neglect or for breach of duty. Id. at §187. Parents 
are not exempt from this duty. As natural guardians of the 
child, they are the trustees of the child's rights which are 
vested in the parents for the benefit of the child. Id. at 
§ 8. They have a duty to protect and preserve the rights and 
welfare of the children, id. at § 14, and are charged with the 
care and management of the children's estates. Id. at § 48. 
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B. Application of Standard of Review, 
The statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, section 78-14*4, must be held to be a 
constitutional exercise of the Utah Legislature's prerogative 
unless appellants can clearly establish that the statute does not 
meet the two-part test of the rational basis standard of 
review. To meet that test the statute must, first, apply equally 
to all members of the created class. Malan v. Lewis, supra. The 
class created and protected by the Act is health care 
providers. See Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 634 
P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) ("The test . . . is whether there exists 
a rational basis to treat health care providers differently from 
other alleged tort feasors . . . ."). Section 78-14-4 applies 
equally to all health care providers and therefore complies with 
the first prong of the rational basis test. The statute also 
treats equally the affected group, those persons including minors 
who have personal injury claims against health care providers. 
Second, to pass equal protection review the different 
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable 
tendency" to further the legislative objective. Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 
30 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the legislative 
objective behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in upholding 
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the Act and its statute of limitations against constitutional 
challenges. 
It is therefore seen that the Act was premised 
upon the need to protect and insure the continued 
availability of health care services to the 
public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to 
shield insurance companies from legitimate claims. 
The legislature exercised its discretionary prero-
gative in determining that the shortening of the 
statute of limitations (along with requiring 
notice of intention to sue), would insure the 
continued availability of adequate health care 
services. 
635 P.2d at 32 ;6 see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
Appellants' main challenge to the Act is to simply 
question the 1976 Legislature's wisdom in enacting the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. Appellants' argument is inappro-
priate in this forum. Judicial review of legislation does not 
include a re-evaluation of the facts the Legislature could have 
considered to determine the necessity for the enactment. The 
constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause 
does not depend on a court's hindsight assessment of the 
empirical success or failure of the measure's provisions. As 
Justice Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981): 
"whether in fact the Act will promote the [legislative 
6The Allen decision is cited by the court in Malan v. Lewis 
as supporting for the second prong of the equal protection— 
rational basis test. 693 P.2d at 670. 
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objectives] is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is 
satisfied by our conclusion that the [state] Legislature could 
rationally have decided" that the means chosen will promote the 
legislative objectives. (Emphasis added.) Where there was 
evidence before the legislature which, if believed to be true, 
supported the creation of the statutory classification, a 
plaintiff cannot invalidate the statute by asking the court to 
accept an argument that the legislature may have been mistaken. 
Id. The prior evidence before the Legislature cannot now be 
received. 
Many of the materials, reports and statistics which 
were presented to the 1976 Utah Legislature prior to the 
enactment of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are assuredly 
no longer available.7 Even the scattered reports available, as 
reported in previous decisions of the Court, however, provide 
ample support for the Legislature's belief that tort reform in 
1One primary reason for not going back into the "evidence" 
on which the Legislature based its judgment is the typical 
unavailability of the data and discussion surrounding a 
particular piece of legislation. The bulk of material that was 
accumulated on the Health Care Malpractice Act was presented and 
discussed in hearings before the Interim Social Services 
Committee. A report of that material was apparently made 
available to the Legislature. Although the hearings were 
recorded, that material is routinely destroyed by the archives 
department after several years. It is therefore impossible for 
any party to present to the court all of the data relied upon by 
the Legislature in making its informed decision. 
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the medical malpractice area was needed to insure the continued 
availability of quality health care, and that the shortening of 
the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims would 
further that objective. In Allen this Court so concluded. 635 
P.2d 31-32. 
The Legislature's justification for creating a 
shortened statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims 
remains equally valid today. One of the purposes of the statute 
of limitations is to encourage prompt presentation of claims so 
that the alleged tort feasor has a fair opportunity to defend. 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed. 
259 (1979). One court explained the problems with delay: 
When any alleged tort feasor is required to defend 
a claim long after the alleged wrong has occurred, 
the ability to successfully do so is diminished by 
reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses, 
and lost documents. As the years between injury 
and suit increases so does the probability that 
the search for truth at trial will be impeded and 
contorted to the benefit of the plaintiff. This 
harm can be exacerbated where the injured party 
continues to grow, develop and change, both 
physically and mentally, after the injury 
complained of has occurred. 
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 
585, 604 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has likewise 
acknowledged that protection is needed against the filing of 
tardy claims, and that the medical malpractice statute 
limitations has the salutary effect of "adequately shielding 
health care providers from claims against which it may be 
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difficult to defend because of the lapse of time . . . .* Foil 
v, Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1979). 
The Legislature properly recognized the need to treat 
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort 
actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limita-
tions. Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice 
case would create an insurmountable problem of trying to 
determine the applicable standard of care long after the treat-
ment and injury occur. Advances in knowledge and technology 
occur so rapidly in medicine that state-of-the-art treatment 
today is likely to be considered substandard in the very near 
future. It is unreasonable to assume that a court or jury can 
determine the applicable standard of care with any degree of 
fairness ten or fifteen years after the fact. It would be 
impossible for jurors to fairly assess the physician's actions 
based upon an ancient standard of care without taking into 
account their personal knowledge of advances which have occurred 
during the ensuing decades which make older techniques of 
treatment seem inappropriate. 
These practical problems of presenting a case more than 
a decade old are compounded in this case since Jennifer is not 
only a minor but a mental incompetent. Even after Jennifer 
reaches majority she will still be unable and legally incompetent 
to make decisions concerning her own legal rights. She will 
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remain unable to initiate legal proceedings in her own behalf. 
If one accepts appellants' argument that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled until an injured minor is competent 
to bring an action on his own behalf, the statute of limitations 
for a medical malpractice claim for Jennifer and others similarly 
situated may never commence to run, and an action on their behalf 
could be instituted decades after the cause of action arises. 
The potential liability of a health care provider and the 
exposure of his liability insurer in that situation becomes 
indefinite; the setting of insurance rates and reserves becomes 
an exercise in futility. It was the spectre of this unjust 
burden which led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude: 
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent per-
sons from the generally tolling provisions [Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-36] is rationally related to the stated 
purpose of containing the malpractice insurance 
crisis. That rationality is particularly evidenced by 
the facts of the present case. Serious permanent 
injuries to children are often cases of large potential 
damages. If the period in which such claims could be 
brought were tolled until the young child reached the 
age of majority, a heavy burden would be placed on 
insurance carriers in evaluating and defending against 
the claim, establishing appropriate reserve require-
ments, and setting rates. The percentage of medical 
malpractice claims brought by minors is far from 
insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty inherent in 
tolling the period in which such claims may be brought 
could drastically affect insurance rates of at least 
this segment of health care providers that provide 
services exclusively to minors. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. at 158. 
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The federal court further stated that the burden of 
weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and 
thereby to ensure the availability of health care services 
against the competing interests of minors and mental incompetents 
whose parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a 
problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts. Id. 
The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature 
are important: 
Furthermore any possible harm that may be suffered 
by a minor whose parents or guardians fail to 
initiate the action against a potential tortious 
wrongdoer within the appropriate time period may 
be outweighed by the chaos, uncertainty, and 
severe prejudice which will occur to those accused 
of tortious conduct, their insurance carriers, and 
ultimately to the insurance carriers' rate payers 
when lawsuits are permitted to be initiated 
decades after the occurrence of the incident 
giving rise thereto. Before such a sweeping 
change is made the question of "reserve 
requirements" imposed on insurance carriers and 
the resulting effect on insurance rates as well as 
many other issues must be addressed. The 
Legislature, not the courts, is the proper forum 
for the resolution of such issues. 
De Santis v. Yaw, 290 Pa. Super. 535, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (1981). 
Based upon the authorities cited above, appropriate 
principles of judicial review, and the legislative objectives 
behind the enactment of the Act and its statute of limitations, 
it is clear that § 78-14-4 complies with state as well as federal 
guarantees of equal protection of laws and does not deny these 
appellants access to the courts. Other jurisdictions which have 
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analyzed equal protection and due process attacks by minor 
plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations 
have reached similar results. See, e.g., Donabedian v. Manzer, 
153 Cal. 3d 592, 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1984); Kite v. Campbell, 142 
Cal. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983) (statute providing that 
medical malpractice actions by a minor must be commenced within 
three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act did not 
deny a minor's right to due process under law; as a matter of 
constitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in nature 
and does not destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 
Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983) (statute which shortens 
period of limitation for minors and incapacitated persons in 
medical malpractice actions did not violate equal protection or 
due process); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super 261, 453 A.2d 342 
(1982) (the settled rule is that it is not violative of any 
constitutional rights to hold minors bound equally with adults to 
the prescribed statutory periods within which legal causes of 
action may be brought); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, 
403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (statute of limitations did not violate 
due process and equal protection provisions of state or federal 
constitutions on ground that statute treated minors injured 
through medical malpractice differently from minor victims of 
other torts); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981) 
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of 
A-37 38-
limitations and was properly dismissed); Johnson v. St. Vincent 
Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (time 
limitation affecting medical malpractice claim for death of a 
minor child was not contrary to due process and equal protec-
tion) ; Rohrabauqh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980) 
(court held that the legislature was not constitutionally 
mandated to suspend application of statutes of limitation in 
cases of infancy or incapacity and dismissed appeal which 
challenged constitutionality of statute of limitations of medical 
malpractice act)• 
CONCLUSION 
\ In light of the above, these respondents respectfully 
request'the Court to affirm the lower court's determination that 
the appellants' discovery of the complained of injury occurred at 
least prior to NoV^mber 1977 and triggered the statute of 
limitations, which nowsl^ars their complaint. Further, the Court 
should find that the actionNqf the Utah Legislature in enacting 
the Utah Health Care Malpractic^N^ct and its statute of 
limitations is an appropriate responke^to a legitimate and real 
concern. It is, after all, the public whlqh ultimately pays the 
cost of professional liability insurance and benefits from the 
continued availability of such coverage when injurifes are suf-
fered. In the furtherance of that objective, the legislature 
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